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PREFACE 
Until as little as two decades ago, biologists, economists, politicians and the public 
generally saw population as setting sharp limits for the prosperity of mankind. The 
thought is expressed by every major classical economist after Adam Smith; to find dissent 
from it one has to drop down to figures like Godwin in England and Henry George in the 
United States, neither of them regarded as a deep thinker either in his own day or 
subsequently. Marx did oppose Malthus, but only as a central feature of his case against 
capitalism. Marx and Malthus agreed fully that under a market system a larger population 
is the major threat to welfare; in fact Marx was even more emphatic on the point than 
Malthus, and differed only in thinking he had found an alternative system under which this 
defect of the market could be circumvented. Textbooks of economics all showed 
diminishing per capita income with increased population, at least beyond a certain point 
of density that they agreed had been passed some time ago. 
After a century and a half of virtual unanimity among those scholars whose opinions 
we respect a split appeared in the 1960s and 1970s. On the one side and placing less 
emphasis on controlling population in the interest of development are many neoclassical 
economists, some governments and some of the public in the developed countries; on the 
other side, expressing themselves even more strongly on the damage to welfare caused by 
dense population than did the 19th century economists, are biologists and other scientists, 
part of the public, most of the governments of the less developed countries. 
The following brief review of the literature is offered as a preliminary to resolution 
of the difference. My limited objective will be fully attained if it does nothing more than 
present the two sides with impartiality. I tried to give space to each argument in 
proportion to its intellectual weight, not in proportion to my agreement with it. Indication 
of points at which I failed to maintain the knife-edge balance will be appreciated. 
ABSTRACT 
Biologists and intelligent lay writers are raising the alarm on what is coming if 
population continues to increase: exhaustion of soils and mass starvation, deterioration of 
the ecosphere to the point where it is not livable, or if not that then at the very best 
declining incomes and loss of the amenities and accomplishments to which this generation 
has become accustomed. On the other side neoclassical economics, that also has a lay 
following, provides optimistic comfort: with modern ingenuity, given scope and stimulus by 
the freeing of markets, all shortages will be overcome, all deterioration repaired. Not 
population, but artificial constraints on the market, are doing the damage. The present 
survey is concerned with the consequences of population change and takes for granted that 
once development occurs population will come under control. 
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POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE ECOSPHERE: 
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 
Nathan Keyfitz 
--Only the variables put into the 
equation can emerge in the solution. 
Are there too many people or too few? Stated in so general a form the question has 
no sense, and yet a large literature both contemporary and ancient puts forward 
unqualified general answers in one direction or the other. Some of the literature is in 
scientific journals in various fields; much more is in the popular press and magazines. The 
Brundtland Report (1987) and the Amsterdam Declaration (1990) are two of hundreds of 
recent documents expressing the sense of urgency in relation to population as well as to 
the deterioration of the environment; the National Academy of Sciences (1986) report sees 
few problems in either population or environment that cannot be solved by sound 
economic policies. 
A worldwide controversy is going forward on the disasters that are pending--or not 
pending --with present rates of overall growth of the human population, yet because many 
disciplines are involved, and because proponents publish in different places, one feature 
of a debate is lacking: point by point presentation and rebuttal. Neither side takes the 
other seriously enough to answer its arguments in their own terms. We all want to be 
empirical but the most relevant facts are inaccessible to present observation: whether oil 
supplies will run out before they can be replaced by other sources of energy is indeed a 
matter of fact, but one only ascertainable over the course of future centuries. Even the 
facts that are to hand are subject to grossly different interpretations. 
The major less developed countries themselves see population control as their main 
problem. President Soeharto of Indonesia declares that 
The primary objective of the Indonesian Government's policy is to reduce the 
rate of population growth ... In the 1978 guidelines for state policy, priority was 
given to national family planning to curb fertility. 
They see each birth now as one more educated young person looking for a job 15 or 20 
years hence, and in the absence of resources and capital little prospect of finding one. 
The discipline that is directly concerned with human population--demography--and 
that might logically be refereeing the debate, be helping to decide whether the alarm 
(McNamara 1984) is justified and what ought to be done, has on the whole avoided 
participation. Articles and papers on the nature of sustainable development, on carrying 
capacity, and on other concepts that the debate has thrown up, are not conspicuous in our 
journals and are seldom read in our professional meetings. 
Meanwhile the outsider can only be surprised at the absence of civility in the style 
of discussion. Neither side sees the arguments of the other as rational. William Baumol of 
Princeton speaks of "many hysterical [sic] predictions about our environmental future" 
(back cover of Simon (1981)) and Harold Barnett of "popular press books with their whole 
array of crisis allegations." (same back cover). Says Simon (1981, p. 286): 
The Limits to Growth simulation ... is not worth detailed discussion or criticism ... 
[it is] public relations hype ...[ and the Club of Rome] scared many people with 
these lies. 
And the same applies to other work, entirely unrelated to the Club of Rome: Global 2000's 
(Barney 1981) conclusions are "almost wholly without merit and the method shoddy," says 
Simon. The only point in reminding the reader of the style of debate is to show the effect 
(use of words like "hysterical," "lies," "shoddy") of one discipline being unable to fit the 
other into its own schemes, or even to talk clearly about the other discipline. The language 
of economics has evolved in such a way as to provide no place for ecology, and that of 
ecology can find no way to express such economic concepts as substitution. 
The following brief survey of a vast and scattered literature is designed to pose the 
question: how can we bring our science of demography to the point where it is relevant to 
what others think is the most pressing issue in the field in which we work? 
THE ISSUES ARE NOT NEW 
Even in the time of the classical economists the issues were by no means new. It 
takes little search to find them repeated over and over again through the centuries 
(Stangeland 1904; United Nations 1973; Petersen 1972). For Cicero (44 B.C.) as for other 
Roman writers who touched on the subject there could never be too many Romans--men 
who would conquer the lands on which they would maintain themselves, and women who 
would breed soldiers to conquer further lands. 
By the time of the Mercantilists sentiment was still emphatically populationist, but 
now for reasons economic rather than military (Spengler 1942; Riley 1985). Jean Bodin 
(1576) put the matter succinctly and equally without qualification: "There is no wealth but 
men [sic];" at the worst they could be put to work making cloth or other goods tradeable 
for gold, and so add to the assets of the sovereign. (Still the Mercantilists spoke of the 
disorder and crime that they saw as resulting from denser population and the growth of 
cities.) 
For 150 years the Malthusian proposition that population tends to outrun its food 
supply was the basis of all discussion of the matter. "Malthus was the father of 
demography," say Caldwell and Caldwell (1986, p. 4) among many others, and few fields 
have had so clear a parentage, based on so simple an idea. That proposition was expressed 
in its least qualified form in the first edition of Malthus's Essay (1798). (An easily 
accessible version with an insightful introduction is by Kenneth Boulding (Malthus 1967)). 
The first edition contains little statistical material and not much about the way real 
populations do in fact control their numbers to avoid impoverishing themselves, but 
plentiful data appear in the six later editions. 
The  harm that population growth can do to the general welfare is shown in Ricardo's 
(1821) exposition of rent, on a simple model in which with everything else the same 
additional people will necessitate the use of marginal lands, and the smaller returns that 
can be earned on these will become the standard returns for all workers, with 
correspondingly larger amounts going to proprietors. "Ronald Lee's (1980) estimates for 
pre-industrial England suggest that a 10 percent increase in population depressed real 
wages by 22 percent and raised rents by 19 percent" (Preston 1988, p. 3). 
John Stuart Mill (1848) introduced the qualification that in secondary manufacturing 
increasing returns to scale would be the rule, but these could be  obtained by international 
trade, so there was no need for any country to push its population to the  point where 
scarce foodstuffs brought down the general standard of living. In fact small countries could 
well have an advantage. As  Kuznets (1960, p. 32) says, "[?T]he proper framework of social 
institutions ... is a n  indispensable prerequisite for economic growth .... The distinctive 
advantage of small nations lies in this determinant of economic growth--not in technology 
of production." For Mill the diminished food per capita as  population grew (successive 
mouths having the same need, and successive pairs of hands producing less) combined with 
the cheapening of secondary goods to set an optimum number for population, a concept 
that Sauvy (1963, Volume 1, pp. 50-54 and throughout) makes central to analysis of the 
effect of population on welfare, notwithstanding its static character. 
An American radical who saw no limits to population was Henry George (1902, p. 
141). George echoed Mill's observation about hands and mouths, but went the opposite 
way: "the new mouths ... require no more food than the old ones, while the hands they bring 
with them can ...p roduce more." On the other hand, Alfred Marshall (1961) anchors the 
economy firmly in its physical base. Thus a typical statement (p. 195): "Climate has a large 
share in determining the necessities of life." Marshall saw the economy as seated in the 
environment rather than floating above it. 
The economist who railed most violently against Malthus was Karl Marx, in various 
places using arguments that he could not have meant seriously: "If Malthus is right the 
world was already overpopulated when there was one person on it" (Meek 1953, p. 59). 
Marx agreed completely with Malthus on the disadvantage of population in a market 
society, and this disadvantage underlay his argument for socialism. In population, as in 
some other matters, the Peoples' Republic of China was for a time loyally Marxist. 
"Population is not a problem under socialism," declared the head of the Chinese delegation 
at Bucharest. But as an  example of ideological flexibility, just a few years later in 1983: "We 
must lay special stress on population control ... late marriage and one child per couple," said 
Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang (quoted in Demeny 1985). 
POST WORLD WAR I1 DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
In the 1960s the Harod-Domar (Domar 1957) model as applied to the LDCs 
assumed unlimited labor and disregarded land altogether, so in effect making capital the 
source of wealth. Twentieth century classics are  Arthur Lewis (1955) and Gunnar Myrdal 
(1968), the former mainline economics, the latter more alert to social variables, both 
demonstrating the handicap constituted by dense and fast-growing population. Also 
somewhat old, but still widely read is the work of Benjamin Higgins (1979), which gives 
special attention to  Indonesia. None of these books challenges the Malthus-Ricardo-Mill 
view that population growth beyond some moderate density (already passed in most of the 
LDCs) is a clear drawback for individual welfare and for the economy as a whole. They 
all put population control in the forefront of the measures needed for development. As 
Frank Notestein expressed it: 
[ q h e  problems of economic development would be greatly simplified if the 
rate of population growth could be cut by a drastic reduction of fertility in the 
LDCs (Notestein 1975, p. 541). 
Gunnar Myrdal's (1972, p. 211) expression was to the same effect: 
...p opulation increase is the key factor in the environmental problem. Natural 
resources have to be considered in relation to the population which is to be 
provided for. 
CAPITAL SHORTAGE 
Two books that took technical advance into account, and contributed some relatively 
solid numbers, were Coale and Hoover (1958) and Coale (1986). After showing that India 
was likely to be able to produce the food it needed for several decades ahead, they 
focussed on its limited capacity for capital accumulation. T o  oversimphfy their argument, 
any increment of population would require tools and other capital at least equal to what 
its predecessors had used if it was to have the same livelihood, and this would require 
capital even before capital was used for the innovation in which development consists. "It 
is precisely in having more resources available for fruitful investment that we have found 
the principal economic advantage of reduced fertility" (p. 328). The Harod-Domar model 
is part of the background for this. 
The methodology introduced by Coale and Hoover was to calculate the pace of 
development in India and Mexico on various assumptions of the rate of population growth. 
It is not easy to estimate how income will move with more people and how with fewer 
people, and yet it is only by estimating these for a particular territory that the question of 
too many people or not enough can be answered. 
They apply a variant of the Cobb-Douglas production function, a model in which "the 
proportionate increase in national income is the weighted average of the proportionate 
increase in the labor force and the proportional increase in the stock of capital" (p. 325). 
Trials with a range of values of the weighting parameter turn out not to alter greatly the 
conclusion. 
The Coale and Hoover argument held the field for most of twenty years. It was 
explained in every textbook, and was the rationale for large population programs by the 
United States and other countries. Lloyd Reynolds (1969), for example, reflects it: "The 
lower the rate of labor force increase, the smaller the development effort needed to shift 
the economy's center of gravity" (p. 776). But now, says Preston (1988, p. 2): 
[C]apital/labor ratios, like natural resources, have left the center stage of the 
debate ...g rowth of capital stock has played a far smaller role in economic 
growth than had previously been believed. 
What counts, on this view, is not the amount of capital but the abilities of people, human 
capital (Schultz 1961). 
Such indifference to  financial and physical capital is not to be  found in the 
administrative circles of Brasilia or  Jakarta. The view prevailing in such places is far closer 
to  the Harod-Domar model than to the sudden turn from physical capital to human capital 
of neo-classical economics. 
IS THE BIRTH RATE A POLICY VARIABLE? 
The only discussion of the 1950s and 1960s was whether birth control programs could 
actually have an effect in the desired lowering of the birth rate. A series of writers, and 
especially Notestein (1945), described what Notestein called a demographic transition, in 
which the birth rate inevitably falls after mortality has fallen and development has reached 
a certain stage. 
Notestein's demographic transition was taken so seriously by some, especially in the 
LDCs, that they asserted that there was no need for sponsored programs of birth control, 
whose instruments would come to be used only after development was well under way and 
not before. Needed therefore was large scale capital aid rather than population programs. 
As Indira Gandhi said, "Development is the best contraceptive," and "Are not poverty and 
need the greatest polluters?" (United Nations 1972, p. 18), phrases that for a decade or 
more rang across the continents. 
Relevant here is the coherence of the family, its provision of old age security in 
particular. Few would disagree with Leibenstein (1957) in attributing the  high fertility of 
traditional societies to the need of parents to secure their old age. Owning children is like 
any other kind of family saving such as owning a bank account o r  a house. (Much less 
often mentioned is the converse-that in industrial societies, that have old age pension 
systems, the birth rate is low because children are not needed for old age security.) When 
no  other savings are  possible one cannot talk people out of having children. 
Work investigating the condition of population in the world and just how much 
difference birth control programs make is due to Berelson (1975) and Mauldin, of which 
an account is given in Ross and Mauldin (1988), and more recently in Mauldin (1990). A 
careful case study is Freedman, Takeshita, et al. (1969) on the decline of fertility in 
Taiwan. Briefly interpreted, all these studies showed that if there is no  economic o r  
cultural incentive to population control then sponsored programs providing contraceptives 
will do  little (e.g., Sauvy 1963, Volume 2, p. 225); if there is full sophistication programs 
are  obviously unnecessary. Many countries and groups within countries now fall between 
these two conditions, and in them the fall of the birth rate is indeed speeded by the 
availability of information and the instruments of contraception. Hermalin (1982), 
reviewing 8 studies, finds strong effects of programs everywhere. Siew-Ean-Khoo (1978) 
finds 48 percent of the fall in fertility attributable to program effects in Hong Kong, 64 
percent in Malaysia. Notestein refers to meaningless debate between advocates of 
economic development, social change, and family planning: "All three are  required, and no 
one is a substitute for another" (p. 541). Accepting that programs do  make a substantial 
difference, the M D C  development community agreed that population control was a crucial 
condition for development. This runs through the writings of Philip Hauser (1963), and 
Donald Bogue (1967). 
Stephen Enke (1969) gave the most uncompromising expression to the argument: 
"One dollar in contraceptive aid does more for development than does $100 in steel mills," 
and his phrase circulated in the highest circles, right up to a speech of President Johnson 
(also Enke 1971). All this was in the 1960s; the argument had lost its hold by the 1980s as 
far as the U.S. administration was concerned. 
Mason and Suits (1981) estimate the value of an averted birth. With a 15 percent 
discount rate the value is $215, similar to the Enke calculation. Since the costs of a child 
precede the benefits, the higher the discount rate the higher the net benefit of preventing 
the birth, and Mason and Suits find a range from $9934 to $90 as they go from a 20 
percent to a 5 percent discount rate. One should use real rather than money rates of 
interest for this purpose, and even 5 percent could well be too high for an estimate of the 
real rate. The models all show that birth control programs pay off, but they also show a 
discouraging variation in results. 
BUCHAREST AND MEXICO CITY 
The view that population control is important for development, on which MDC 
demographers mostly at the time agreed, encountered opposition through the 1970s in 
many of the LDCs. The World Plan of Action of 1971, dominated by the LDCs, had 
started in this vein: "Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Mankind's 
future can be made indefinitely bright" (Demeny 1985, p. 132). The opposition between the 
MDCs (the United States in particular) and the LDCs came to a head in 1974 in 
Bucharest. 
Much has happened since the Bucharest Conference. In the MDCs it began to be 
asked whether family planning was needed at all, whether a larger population, either in 
particular countries or in the world as a whole, would be such a severe handicap to 
development. This fitted with a strong pro-birth, anti-abortion movement in American 
politics, especially in the years since 1980. By the time of the Mexico City Conference in 
1984 (Demeny 1985), the protagonists had changed sides: the LDCs, beginning to 
experience some of the seemingly intractable problems of development, insisted on the 
importance of population aid programs, while the United States expressed uncertainty on 
the need for them, tended to stress the immorality of abortion, and talked much against 
coercion and in favor of the right of couples to have as many children or as few as they 
wanted. 
NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
The contemporary populationist sentiment is expressed by Julian Simon (1982), who 
provides the most unqualified expression since Jean Bodin (1576) of the capacity of 
countries to tolerate indefinite numbers of people. Nothing is produced except by people; 
the more people the more production. 
Underlying all this in its contemporary expression is a profound faith in technology. 
If technology spurred by the free market can liberate production from the land, and if the 
economy shifts towards tertiary industries that require little of either land or capital, then 
with labor as the sole productive agent both population and the economy can expand 
indefinitely. Writers (e.g., Herman et al. 1989) speak of dematerialization of the economy; 
both the inputs and the outputs of production diminish in weight and volume. And 
Malthus' bugbear of food limits is postponed to far in the future in the F A 0  study of 
carrying capacity (Higgins et al. 1982) and Avery (1985) with a discussion of triticale and 
other new discoveries. 
"Higher population density implies faster economic growth in LDCs .... No relationship 
was found between the population growth rate and economic growth" (Simon and Gobin 
1981, p. 299). "In the long run population growth has a positive effect on per capita 
income" (p. 227). Colin Clark (1978, p. 146) has for 40 years been arguing that there is a 
positive relation. Simon Kuznets (1966) assembled a unique collection of statistical data 
and showed that the role of both land and capital in economic growth was less than the 
classical economists had assumed. 
For Kuznets (1966, 1967) population growth brings new labor force into cities in 
early industrialization and also increases demand. H e  shows the association of economic 
growth with population growth and its urban concentration, that in the early days provided 
both the masses of workers and the mass market for their product. H e  comments (1975) 
on the desirability of reducing fertility to accord with contemporary low mortality, but does 
not express any alarm about population increase. A comprehensive review that is 
sympathetic to  the Kuznetsian viewpoint is Perlrnan (1981), like Kuznets giving minimal 
attention to environmental limits. 
The uncertainty in contemporary economics is shown by quotes from J.R. Hicks 
(1971) within a few pages of each other: "Overpopulation through shortage of land is one 
of the great causes of the poverty there is in the world" (p. 65). H e  speaks of 
overpopulation as a "terrible possibility." On the other hand (p. 69): "It is not impossible 
that the slowing-up of population increase may have been one of the things responsible for 
the exceptional unemployment which occurred during the 1930s." 
EFFECTS OF POPULATION ON INSTITUTIONS 
Beyond this and in considerable part outside of economics is a further intellectual 
tradition that makes population a positive element in economic growth. It supposes that 
institutions are not fixed, but change as a function of population. This part of the story 
starts with Durkheim's (1893) study of the division of labor, in which he showed how 
individuals under increasing population pressure would shield themselves by finding some 
specialized activity. Just as species of plants and animals seek ecological niches in which 
they are  sheltered from competition, so humans try to find occupational niches. Durkheim 
so explains the division of labor, regarded from the time of Adam Smith onward as the key 
to economic progress. 
Extending this, Boserup (1981, 1987) presented evidence that population density in 
agricultural areas forces more productive systems of land tenure. She makes her point in 
terms of pressure setting up rules of private ownership, as does Preston (1988): 
[I]n the longer run [family planning programmes] reduce the incentives to 
establish the access rules for such resources that help guarantee their long- 
term availability (p. 8). 
Clark (1967) uses similar arguments to suggest that the effect of population is 
positive. Yet the subject is complicated. Geertz (1963) showed that increasing density in 
Java resulted in a change of institutions all right, but it was in the direction of shared 
poverty, while the lightly settled other islands of Indonesia with their long fallow period 
lived better. 
Albert Hirschman (1958) also speaks of the kinds of institutional changed impelled 
by population. With threatened Ricardian decline in standards of living, people will struggle 
to invent technologies and reorganize production and so avoid decline. 
INSTITUTIONS FOR ORDERLY EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES 
Suitable institutions for the governing of natural resources became a preoccupation 
in the late 1960s. Those that are accessible to all are cared for by none, as Garrett Hardin 
said in a simple but influential article on "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968, pp. 1243- 
1248). Population increase inevitably hastens the destruction of any commons--the grazing 
field of a village, or a nation's forests, or the ocean fisheries. If crowding brings into 
people's vision the greater effectiveness of private ownership of land, and they set up a 
system of land tenure, then their crowding will have brought a major benefit. Individual 
tenure to which the society is urged to move will provide incentives to economizing and 
to innovative methods of production (National Academy of Sciences 1986). 
Everything depends on how people react to the prospective crowding. They could see 
what is coming and limit their numbers as do the hunting and gathering people of the 
Kalahari Desert (Howell 1979) and so avoid a population crisis. If Malthus had read 
Howell he would have cited the !Kung as a favorable example of the preventive check, 
applied at a low level of population density and of production. Durkheim (1893) could have 
cited them as an example of low level stability and stagnation. 
FINITE LIMITING FACTORS: THE MODEL BUILDERS 
The classical economic tradition of population study, concerned with the limits to 
land and hence to food supplies, sensing the impossibility of indefinite exponential 
increase, has now passed to scholars of other disciplines. Kahn and Wiener (1967) was 
among the first to attract attention with a model in which population was no great obstacle 
to economic growth. An early widely read exposition on the other side was sponsored by 
the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972), and it was followed by Mesavoric and Pestel 
(1974) and other writers. A similar spirit animated a later investigation led by Barney 
(1981). International organizations, especially the ILO, came into this, and many models 
were built for, or in any case applied to, particular countries; among these the BACHUE 
models are the most often cited. 
The acknowledged antecedent of the Club of Rome type model-building was Jay W. 
Forrester (1971). Population is central for Forrester. He  has feedback loops in which 
population is respectively controlled by crowding, pollution, food supply, natural resources. 
Any one of these can bring the exponential population growth to a halt, indeed cause 
sudden and tragic collapse of population (Chapters 2 and 4). "The Malthusian thesis has 
been true and is at work at all times" (p. 27). 
Forrester explains the suddenness of reaching "crisis level" by the property of an 
exponential, for instance one that doubles every 50 years (p. 3). "Even though nothing has 
changed in the underlying law which until then has governed growth ... within one lifetime, 
dormant forces within the world system can exert themselves and take control" (p. 5); "food 
... has been potentially sufficient throughout all of history," yet suddenly we have a 
"starvation crisis" (p. 7).  Though conditions do  not now appear exceptionally bright, yet in 
comparison with both past and future "we may now be living in a 'golden age"' (p. 11). 
There may be no realistic hope of the present underdeveloped countries 
reaching the standard of living demonstrated by the present industrialized 
nations .... With four times as  many people ... their rising ... could mean an increase 
of 10 times in the natural resource and pollution load on the world 
environment (p. 12). 
A more restrained analysis is due to Revelle (1975). H e  takes up the population- 
carrying capacity of the world as a whole with some precise numbers, starting with the 
energy of sunlight, going through its transformation into primary (cereal) food energy, up 
to its availability for humans. His energy conversion process is modeled on that of an Iowa 
farmer, and he finds that potentially arable land on the planet is much larger than any 
contemplated population growth, but the actual use of that land depends on economic and 
social variables. Of value in the paper is its showing where the limits of nature end and the 
powers of human organization begin. 
Says McNicoll(198 I), "The age of dinosaurs among population-development models 
may be  coming to an end." Arthur and McNicoll (1975) and McNicoll (1984) have an 
extended and useful review of such models. Warren Sanderson (1980) reviews seven 
economic-demographic models in some detail. McNicoll(1982, pp. 101-104) has an  elegant 
exposition of Malthus as a successful modeler. 
The work sponsored by the Club of Rome is subject to many questions, yet long after 
its techniques and specific results are forgotten, the Club of Rome will be remembered for 
calling public attention to neglected aspects of economic growth, for being in the van of 
what is now a worldwide ecological movement. 
Meanwhile the more modest model-building of Lestaeghe (1989) deserves mention. 
H e  is especially interested in negative feedbacks that provide stability. O n e  such is the 
Malthusian model. Other sorts of mechanisms include the polygamy of Africa, say in 
Botswana, occasioned by the fact that wives were needed in agriculture. In the 19th century 
the plow was introduced into Botswana, and marriage virtually ceased. Half of the women 
remained unmarried once they were no longer necessary in agriculture. They still had 
children; in fact the high fertility was virtually unaffected by the collapse of marriage; the 
delay of marriage is a means of birth control in some societies (for instance Europe, 
especially Ireland in the 19th century) but not in all societies. 
CARRYING CAPACITY 
The  notion of carrying capacity is congenial to natural scientists at the  same time as 
it is an irritation to  social scientists. To  biologists or  agriculturalists used to studying the 
capacity of pasture lands to maintain livestock, observing famines in overcrowded parts of 
Asia through history, it seems natural to take it that beyond a certain point population in 
a given area will bring misery. Not a little of this is implied in the early writings of 
Malthus. Those who sponsor this view tend to downplay trade, but even if trade is admitted 
there must be certain carrying capacity for the world as a whole, say those who write along 
this line. Thus a background paper by Kirchner to the World Bank's (1984) World 
Development Report starts: 
The carrving - capacity - of a particular region is the maximum population of a 
given species that can be supported indefinitely, allowing for seasonal and 
random changes, without any degradation of the natural resource base that 
would diminish this maximum population in the future. The concept of 
carrying capacity is familiar to biologists and wildlife managers .... With 
modifications, it is also an important measure of the ability of regions to 
support human populations. 
The economic viewpoint stands in sharp contrast to this, and one branch of the 
debate concerns food resources and the effects of MDC extravagance in converting the 
largest part of its grain calories into meat. D. Gale Johnson (1974) makes the point that 
conservation has no sense: If the industrial countries had held down their indirect grain 
consumption there would have been less produced, reserve stocks would have been smaller, 
and the institutions required to handle grain exports would not have existed. In brief, 
American extravagance in meat consumption results, through the market, in a reserve 
against famine elsewhere in the world. 
The argument is unassailable on its terms, but the terms change drastically once the 
environment is brought in. The loss of soil and of water, the poisoning of streams with 
fertilizers and insecticides, are a different and more difficult matter. 
ECOLOGY 
We find biologists critical of the excesses of economic growth, sometimes opposing 
not only the excesses but economic growth itself. Some of this shows up in the April 1986 
Bulletin of the Atonzic Scientists, which contains a semi-popular discussion of population and 
other important matters by Ehrlich, Choucri, Djerassi, and others. The work by Ehrlich 
that attracted initial popular attention was The Population Bomb (1968), to which a recent 
sequel is The Population Explosion (1990). Scorned by demographers, such books have the 
respect of scientists in other fields. A somewhat offbeat economist, E.J. Mishan (1969), in 
effect joins the biologists, and so does Herman Daly (1977, 1989). Encyclopedic coverage 
of the field, no longer new, but still valuable, is Ehrlich et al. (1977). 
The best known of the institutions that have committed themselves to monitoring the 
effects of population and economic growth on the biosphere is Lester R. Brown's 
Worldwatch Institute. It puts out an annual report on progress toward a sustainable society, 
of which the 1990 (Brown et al. 1990) edition is now available: Included in this is a global 
action plan, with a clirnate-sensitive energy strategy, an approach to maintaining forest 
cover, meeting future food needs, and stabilizing population. 
Recognized for its authoritative studies aimed at knowledgeable though not 
necessarily professional audiences, is the World Resources Institute with its annual survey 
of resources (1990 and earlier years). Running out of minerals, especially metals, coal and 
oil, was the main ecological preoccupation of earlier generations; it now appears that these 
minerals are more widespread than was thought and that in any case substitutes for them 
can be invented. A survey of this area is provided by Repetto (1985). 
Herman Daly (1986) calls attention to the factor of scale, that is the heart of the 
distinction between the neoclassical and ecological views. We find anticipation of this in 
Coale and Hoover (1958): 
In the long run the generated by indefinite growth becomes the dominant 
factor in the economics of population (Coale and Hoover 1958, p. 331). 
In Forrester's (1971, p. 19) model "birth rate" and "death rate" are measured in absolute 
numbers of people per year, rather than in the ratio of this quantity to population that is 
the usual demographic definition of rate. The neoclassical economics of population might 
be true in a world that contains one billion people or less, the ecological view might be true 
of a world containing five billion or more. For most problems one would have to deal with 
smaller areas than the world as a whole, but whatever the area, absolute numbers and 
ratios lead to very different interpretations of trends. It is absolute totals that are 
bounded, if there are bounds, never ratios. What is troubling about much of the literature 
is the lack of any serious effort to assign numerical bounds to theoretical assertions. 
A COMMITTEE WILL DECIDE THE QUESTION? 
A seemingly practical way to resolve the differences indicated in the literature is to 
appoint a committee. Individual scholars may be eccentric; a committee ought to have a 
balanced view. The literature includes two series of committee reports. 
Three widely-disseminated reports resulted from conferences of the American 
Assembly of Columbia University. The first was edited by Philip M. Hauser (1963). The 
second was a book edited by Jane Menken (1986), that showed the influence of the 
National Academy of Sciences (1986). A third book is now in press (Matthews 1990). 
These three books present a remarkable sequence. The first gave the case for 
population control unselfconsciously, with no apologies, having in its background the then 
current work of Coale and Hoover; the second was much less sure of the importance of 
family planning; the third expresses certainty that an ecological catastrophe looms, and 
even the most energetic efforts at family planning may already be too late. In the second, 
that took the population crisis calmly, demographers were the major exponents; the third 
consisted largely of lay people--journalists, congressmen, industrialists, diplomats--as well 
as biologists and natural scientists. 
Corresponding differences show among reports of committees of the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS). The first were in 1971 (NAS 1971; Revelle 1971) that found 
in rapid population growth perhaps the most serious of all the handicaps to development. 
The much milder conclusion of the second (NAS 1986), based on economic considerations 
alone, was merely that economic growth would be somewhat faster with slower than with 
faster population increase. It found the main reason for birth control outside of economics: 
that people have the moral right to regulate the number of their children. So also thought 
Lenin: 
Lenin's concept of birth control as a human right had a lasting influence both 
upon socialist writings and health policies affecting fertility (United Nations 
1973, Volume 1, p. 49). 
A convenient summary of the second NAS report is provided by Preston (1988). 
Evidently committees reflect the opinions dominant in the disciplines of their 
members at the time when the committees meet and report. 
It is well to say that to determine the size of one's family is a basic human right, but 
what if people want many children and the population grows fast? What then about the 
right to a livelihood in exchange for work? We must try to balance at the margin the 
immorality of restricting births with the immorality of letting people starve (Demeny 1985). 
EXTERNALITIES 
Wherever mainline economics textbooks today recognize the ecology in which the 
economy is embedded, they consider its problems as examples of market failure, due to 
the existence of costs and benefits of production or consumption external to the decision- 
making firm or person, and show how costs and benefits can be internalized and so bring 
the problem within the scope of the market. Where externalities damaging to the 
environment arise they propose creating a market by selling transferable rights to pollute. 
Externalities are at the center of the discussion whether childbearing is a boon or a 
hindrance to the community. Samuel Preston (1988) says: 
The net balance of external effects [of the household's fertility] was not likely 
to be quantitatively large .... It is difficult to make the case that other families 
suffer a net loss or gain from one family's childbearing (pp. 23-24). 
Contemporary families may not suffer, but what about those a generation or two hence, 
when the effects of crowding appear? 
Economic writings also mention, though with much more hesitation, the difference 
between market rates of discount and social rates. Operators in the market come and go 
and they borrow and lend for short-run purposes; the nation and society go on forever, and 
accepting that can make any positive rate of discount too high. One cannot afford to 
borrow at commercial rates to protect the future environment. 
Should governments not take responsibility for the future if markets cannot do it? 
But governments seem to have an even nearer horizon than businessmen; if the latter 
cannot be responsible for the future even less can the former. These admittedly difficult 
matters find little place in textbooks, or in global economic analysis (for example of 
Tinbergen 1962). 
RESOURCES 
Barnett and Morse (1963) decried calls for husbanding of resources on a new and 
original ground. For them the uniformity of energy and matter are such that anything can 
be turned into anything else. This eliminates all possible limits; no quantitative restraints 
or particular scarcities can appear in a world in which everything can be turned into 
anything else. 
Among the few economists who have taken the exhaustion of resources seriously, 
with its implications for intergenerational equity, was Stanley Jevons, concerned with how 
England would maintain its large population (then about 25 million) when it ran out of 
coal. Since that particular worry turned out to be misplaced, he gets little credit, and for 
good enough reasons the need to control population is not usually nowadays argued from 
the limits of mineral resources. But certain non-mineral resources, especially water and 
soil, forests and fisheries, come under increasing pressure, and some of Jevons' argument 
on concern for the children and grandchildren of those now alive could well be transferred 
to them. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
A clear example of non-sustainability of short-run solutions is the use of chemical 
pesticides, that often are more effective against the predators on the pest than on the pest 
itself, and so result in increasing the pest they aim to control. Examples abound, first 
pointed out by American authors, among whom the pioneer was Rachel Carson (1962); 
Perring and Mellanby (1978) is a subsequent book on the same theme. After the pesticides 
most dangerous to man and least useful in controlling pests were banned in the United 
States, the producers turned to markets abroad, where only with some delay has suitably 
restrictive legislation been introduced. 
Not the least of the elements that drive the use of pesticides is the growth of 
population. The same applies to fertilizers and weed-killers. We have built up population 
on the food output that these chemical means permit, and we cannot entirely stop their 
use, but only try to moderate their worst effects. Biologists are only now learning how they 
may be used with discretion in combination with biological controls. 
In the same way the extinction of species results from population growth. It causes 
more land to be cultivated, more cultivated land to be taken over by urban municipalities, 
more trees to be cut down and forest species to be displaced. Animal and plant species 
come and go in the normal course of evolution, but never has the disappearance of species 
been as rapid as today. Writers in Elliott (1986) emphasize those disappearances caused 
by human activities, and the way that such activities simplify ecological systems and make 
the web of life less stable. More detail is provided in Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1983). 
Specific effects of worldwide development in its present course on oceans, on forests, 
on deserts, are documented in a large section of the literature, for instance Borgese and 
Ginsburg (1978) and Repetto (1988). 
DISAGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
If neoclassical economics and demography are not agitated by prospective population 
growth, neither are they disturbed by the global warming and its incident disturbances that 
are forecast by climatologists. 
Nordhaus (1990) says that "Most economic activity in industrialized countries ... 
depends very little on the climate ....[q he impacts of climate changes on developed 
countries are likely to be small, probably amounting to less than 1 percent of national 
income over the next century." He says that "those calls to arms against global warming 
have been made without an attempt to weigh the costs and benefits of restraint." Nordhaus 
does not speak for himself alone; Robert Solow (1988) had an op. ed. article in the New 
York Times that said much the same. 
To show how the danger is variously assessed, I quote John Maddox (1990) who 
asserts that the stakes are high: "Perhaps even comparable with the threat of nuclear war." 
That puts it altogether outside of the range of economic costs and benefits! 
We have in all this one discipline against another, and such differences we have no 
formal way of resolving. The resolution, too difficult for the disciplines in question, is left 
to administrators and politicians. These are bound to make decisions, even if only implicitly 
in the policies they adopt. 
CAN TECHNOLOGY RECONCILE ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY AND ALSO PROVIDE 
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
One key to reconciling the economic and the ecological approach is technology. Some 
write the phrase "transfer of technology" as equivalent to "economic development," and 
both together as equivalent to "modernization." A summary is given in Johnston and Sasson 
(1986), whose chapter on Biotechnologies and Food Systems is especially relevant; 
changing from chemical controls to genetics could solve many problems. Finding or making 
food plant species that thrive on seawater would bring North African and other coastal arid 
lands back into production. The book contains an extensive bibliography, mostly dealing 
with the positive side of the technology that has developed since World War 11. The 
standard multi-volume work that attempts to summarize all technologies is the 
Encyclopedia of Science and Technology (1982), of which the most recent annual update is 
the Yearbook of Science and Technology (1989). 
Lester Brown (1975, pp. 15-24) shows that ordinary food supplies are tight and he 
encourages moves to non-animal shortenings, to margarine, to non-dairy whipped toppings 
and coffee whiteners, to soya-based meat substitutes. For Barry Commoner (1971) the 
present direction of technology may well solve every problem, but in doing so creates new 
problems that are even more difficult; we need to reverse direction, to seek softer and 
simpler technologies. A useful reference for this and other social aspects is Durbin (1980). 
The most severe indictment of contemporary technology is its wasteful use of energy, 
and especially energy derived from fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide resulting from combustion 
is a main culprit in changing the constitution of the atmosphere. Barry Commoner, with 
others (1975), is among those who has shown effects of increasing energy use. In a series 
of books and papers he shows how inappropriate technology has generated waste and 
pollution. 
Clearly technology is the cause of many of the present problems, and it is also the 
chief hope of solving them. Population also is the cause of problems, and its control the 
means of mitigating them. How then can responsibility for present difficulties be allocated; 
how much is due to population and how much to technology? When two factors operate 
for good or for bad, sharing the credit or the blame is a difficult problem of imputation. 
Enormous effort went into determining how much of production was due to labor, land 
and capital respectively. The great classic on this was Schultz (1958), who shows the 
innumerable assumptions and decisions that have to be made to establish the imputation. 
Imputing environmental problems to technology and to population requires a similar 
method. Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990) do it with the decomposition E=PGT, where E is the 
environmental damage, the undesired output, P the population, G the Gross National 
Product per capita, and T the quantity and kind of technology used. One school will hold 
constant technology and income, and blame population for all problems; another will hold 
constant population and allocate the blame to technology or to income. It is fairer to take 
it that these three "production" factors are all operative; if they work independently we can 
operate a simple decomposition on readily available data, as Ehrlich and Commoner do, 
but that will not satisfy those who see the factors as interrelated. In particular high incomes 
are not possible without advanced technologies, and the most advanced technologies are 
not the most benign. And the scheme breaks down completely if dense population itself 
improves technology and raises income, as NAS (1986) seems at some points to argue. 
Those who find the evidence for such relationships meager will come back to the Ehrlich 
and Commoner decomposition. 
DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE FOR PARTICULAR COUNTRIES AND AREAS 
The richest part of the development literature is the monographs on specific areas, 
of which there are hundreds--for instance Shaw (1983) and Kelley et al. (1982), both 
dealing with the Middle East. The island of Mauritius is an instructive case because it is 
a bounded territory, that up to the 1960s was miserably poor, almost wholly dependent on 
exports of sugar to a world market in which prices had fallen to low levels, and with a 
rapidly increasing population. Since that time its economy has diversified and its 
population growth checked. Wolfgang Lutz of IIASA is undertaking a major study to find 
out why and how. 
The World Bank is a particularly valuable source of data, not only in its annual World 
Developr?tertt Reports but in the series of country monographs, usually written by 
distinguished scholars on the basis of actual examination. These are issued by reputable 
publishers, including the Johns Hopkins Press, and are an unsubstitutable contribution to 
the development literature. Some do and some do not emphasize population control. 
UNBALANCED UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Case studies of particular areas show innumerable instances of disequilibrium--in 
food, in population, in rising wages--that price countries out of manufacturing. The most 
obvious disequilibrating force is population growth; Frank and McNicoll (1987) study 
Kenyan rural institutions in the face of averages of five or more children per woman 
surviving to adulthood. No agricultural inheritance system can last unchanged for many 
generations with the division of holdings that this implies. 
The standard general literature shows how to devise policies that will keep GNP 
rising uniformly year after year, as far as possible in a semi-automatic process of balanced 
growth. Opposed to this history-free approach is some writing (Hirschman 1958; 
Rosenstein-Rodan 1964) that sees imbalances as fruitful and proposes to take advantage 
of them, even to create imbalances deliberately. 
For Leibenstein (1957) population is endogenous, determined within the model. A 
great shock is necessary to get development moving (technical progress, infusion of 
capital), and when it does get going population growth will fall. Until it gets going rational 
parents, who have no other way of securing their old age, give little attention to population 
programs that would persuade them to limit their families. 
Various equilibria involving population numbers existed in past times. Before he  had 
efficient stone tools man was in equilibrium with other primates and limited food supplies; 
after agriculture and urbanization he had to come into equilibrium with bacteria (McNeil 
1976). At  each point a preceding balance was disturbed by some (in itself desirable) 
innovation. Currently it is partial development that unbalances matters in a way to demand 
further steps in development. 
Nature is in perpetual change anyhow, and changes effected by our industrial society 
are superimposed on other changes that would occur even if man were not present. With 
all the troubles, we must remember that as Sauvy (1963, Volume 1, p. 4) says, "Le propre 
du dCsCquilibre est d e  crCer le mouvement." There is no question that movement is 
occurring, but are  the conditions such that it is movement towards welfare or  movement 
towards disaster? Economists and ecologists answer this question very differently. 
UNEMPLOYMENT THREATENED BY RAPID POPULATION GROWTH 
Much of the concern of the LDCs from Brazil to Egypt has revolved around 
employment, with increase of GNP thought of as a means to this rather than an end in 
itself. Every government fears an unemployed educated population. Huge debts incurred 
in the 1970s and 1980s were intended to purchase capital to employ urban citizens, now 
coming out of schools and colleges in the thousands. With the closing off of further loans, 
at least from the private banks of the United States and Germany, governments turned to 
inflationary financing of the employment of public servants. Thus population growth and 
the need to employ urban youth if civil order is to be maintained can be said to underlie 
indebtedness and inflation. Such a chain of reasoning lies behind Lester Brown's (1976) 
assertion of the connections between population growth and various social and economic 
problems, connections far beyond any that appear in current economics. 
In the creation of the disequilibrium represented by the employment problem 
education has a major part. Increasing population, an increasing fraction of which has 
college training and corresponding expectations (Dore 1976), is a chief worry of many 
regimes in the LDCs. U p  to the time of World War I1 cities were small, and the amount 
of higher education was kept down to what would be useful to the colonial powers. In that 
equilibrium population growth was moderate, education was for the few, and the 
population lived out its short lives doing manual work in the countryside. The literature 
divides between those few with a nostalgia for earlier times, and those who would go on 
to something better. Going back or going forward--no one thinks the present condition can 
persist, with many young people not well enough trained to push forward the development 
of their countries, and yet having too much training to be satisfied with actual employment 
possibilities. 
Such disequilibria, having unequal impact among countries, exert powerful pressures 
for migration. 
MIGRATION 
There are a host of ways in which continued underdevelopment can threaten security, 
and not only in the LDCs. They would suffer first, of course: "Without raising their 
incomes we cannot prevent [tribal peoples] from combing the forest for food and 
livelihood; from poaching and from despoiling vegetation" (Indira Gandhi at Stockholm, 
1972). But the trouble is exported to the MDCs. 
Borders nowadays are permeable to unwanted immigrants, and we see these arousing 
a racist response in the United States, France, Britain and elsewhere. The MDCs, 
especially in their capacity of former colonial powers, still feel some responsibility for 
refugees, most of whom now are from LDCs, and these have given rise to severe moral 
dilemmas. 
Simon (1982) proposed free and unselected (to avoid brain drain) migration from 
the LDCs to the MDCs, and pointed out the potential benefits of such movement to both 
sides, but especially the benefit of offsetting declining MDC births. The applause that 
Simon gets from the political right on his other views is more muted on immigration. A 
current issue of Le Monde (June 1990) analyzes how immigrants are threatening the 
traditional liberalism of the French right. 
The moral case for allowing immigration is argued on the culpability of the presently 
developed countries for the plight of the LDCs. That culpability, continuing into the 
present, is presented by such authors as Raul Prebisch (1971), Gunder Frank and Paul 
Baron. Articles in this genre are reprinted in Wilber (1988). These say little about the need 
for population control, and much about opening the borders of the MDCs to trade and 
migration, controlling the multinationals operating in LDCs, offsetting the various 
advantages that the MDCs have through getting there first. Such writings have fewer 
readers today than they had 20 years ago. 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
A minority of economists in good standing have been seriously preoccupied with 
environmental matters, and have produced important work on some of the hidden costs 
of growth. One of the earliest and most emphatic was E.J. Mishan (1969). Involved today 
in this aspect are Herman Daly (Daly and Cobb 1989), Bartelmus (1986), and Arizpe 
(1989). Valuable writings are contained in Dorfman (1977). The World Bank has 
confronted cries of protest against some of its projects, for instance in a special issue of 
the British journal Ecology (1986), and these have brought substantial changes in its aid 
policies. 
For the Brandt Report (1980) the environment does count: everyone agrees on 
preserving peace and abolishing hunger, but many forget that survival also requires solving 
energy and environment problems. The dangers for the global environment derive above 
all from the growth of the industrial economies, but also from population. On the whole 
the report gives little attention to programs for control of population as such, stressing that 
education and development generally will check the present rapid growth. 
The ecological problems engendered by local urban growth by no means cease for 
countries that have attained the developed condition. An extensive discussion for the 
United States is contained in Scott (1975), while other aspects of planning, with special 
reference to English conditions, are taken up in Edington (1973) and Roberts (1986). The 
need to set up suitable international institutions appears in Clark (1989). 
There is a case against rapid population growth that has nothing to do with 
environment and its limits. A long tradition of research and writing is based on the 
comparison of individuals born in large and those born in small families. Restrained 
couples produce children that do better in one way or another. A recent well-received book 
that presents the classical case and adds new evidence is Blake (1989). Intuition suggests 
that population pressures lead to war, but Choucri (1974, p. 60) finds "the direct link 
between density and violent behavior has been found to be weak," though "density does 
appear to have a substantial impact on international violence through a complex causal 
chain." 
POPULAR ALARM AND THE CALM OF DEMOGRAPHERS 
A bibliographic survey is not expected to take account of the popular media-- 
newspapers, magazines, television--that today give an enormous amount of attention to 
population and environment. According to polls in various industrial countries as reported 
in the press, a large fraction of the public sees environmental issues as the most important 
there are. Writers on the ozone layer, global warming, desertification, acid rain, waste 
disposal, etc., keep telling us that growing populations are seriously aggravating the 
problems, and that at a certain point these cancel out any improvement in the quality of 
life that economic growth brings about. 
I repeat that the participants in the debate do not offer point by point rebuttals and 
rejoinders of the opposition arguments. The economist's unlimited substitutions must at 
some point encounter the limits assumed by ecologists; the two cannot coexist in the same 
logical universe. Joint models incorporating both substitution and limits are needed and 
lacking. The human institution interacting with a biological resource (e.g., the world's 
fishing fleets vis a vis the fish population) needs more explicit study than it has had so far. 
The distaste for incorporating alien variables in the models of one's own discipline will 
have to be overcome. 
The comments of some eminent demographers are highly critical of their own 
discipline. Thus Preston (1984): "the field lacks ideas," and in a review for the Ford 
Foundation, Jack and Pat Caldwell (1986) say that many programs to control population 
are divorced from the realities of developing countries. 
The interpretation of statistics can be ambiguous in the debate that this paper 
describes. Is one arguing that population is coming under control? Then use rates, of birth, 
of natural increase, of net reproduction, all of which are declining. Is one arguing that the 
population is on a runaway course? Then use absolute numbers, that for the world as a 
whole will continue to increase for the next 40 years. Such selective use of numbers makes 
a travesty of the empirical analysis that is the great accomplishment of demography. 
A quick summary of the history is that for 150 years the economic and the ecological 
viewpoints were expressed by the same scholars, who called their subject political economy, 
and their conclusions accorded with those of the educated lay public. Then a bifurcation 
occurred, with a more intense specialization in each of economics and ecology. After that 
bifurcation the two disciplines developed mutually incomprehensible languages. 
Demography might seem to be the discipline that could referee the debate. Yet 
demographic practitioners are disinclined to let either popular views and concerns or the 
arguments of other disciplines determine their research agendas. 
REFERENCES 
Amsterdam Declaration. 1990. Population artd Developmertt Review 16(1), March. 
Arizpe, Lourdes. 1989. On the Cultural and Social Sustainability of Economic Development 
Models. Paper presented at 25th Anniversary Symposium "The Next Decade: 
Interdependence in a Multipolar and Two-Track World Economy." Paris, France: 
OECD Development Centre. 
Arthur, Brian W., and Geoffrey McNicoll. 1975. Large scale simulation models in 
population and development: What use to planners. Population and Development 
Review 1 :25 1-265. 
Avery, Dennis. 1985. US farm dilemma: The global bad news is wrong. Science 230:408- 
4 12. 
Bach, Wilfrid, Jurgen Pankrath, and Stephen H. Schneider, Editors. 1981. Food-Climate 
Ittteractiorts. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel. 
Barnett, Harold, and C. Morse. 1963. Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of Natural 
Resource Availability. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press. 
Barney, G.O. 1981. Global 2000: The Report to the President, Entering the 21st Centuv. 
Revised edition. Seven Locks Press. 
Bartelrnus, Peter. 1986. Environment and Development. Boston, Massachusetts: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Berelson, Bernard. 1975. The Great Debate on Population Policy: An Instructive 
Entertainment. New York: Population Council. 
Blake, Judith. 1989. Family Size and Achievement. Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press. 
Bodin, Jean. 1962 [1576]. The Sir Bookr of a Commonwealth. Facsimile of Enghsh 
translation of Les sir livres de la republique. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Bogue, Donald J., Editor. 1967. Sociological Contributions to Family Planning Research. 
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Borgese, Elisabeth Mann, and Norton Ginsburg, Editors. 1978. Ocean Yearbook 1. Chicago, 
Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Boserup, Ester. 1981. Population and Technological Change: A Study of Long Terms. 
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Boserup, Ester. 1987. Population and technology in preindustrial Europe. Population and 
Development Review 13(4):691-701. 
Brandt, W a y  (Chairman). 1980. North-South: A Programme for Survival. Mondadori: 
Independent Commission on International Development Issues. 
Brown, Lester R. 1975. World population and food supplies: Looking ahead. In Papers 
Prepared for the Bucharest Conference, Volume 2, pp. 15-24. New York: United 
Nations. 
Brown, Lester R. 1976. Twenty-Two Dimensions of the Population Problem. Washington, 
D.C.: World Watch Institute. 
Brown, Lester R., et al. 1990 and annually. State of the World 1990: A Worldwatch Institute 
Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Brundtland, G.H. (Chairman, World Commission on Environment and Development). 
1987. Our Common Future. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 1986. Special Issue: Population Growth 42(4). 
Caldwell, Jack and Pat. 1986. Limiting Population Growth and the Ford Foundation 
Contribution. London: Frances Pinter. 
Carson, Rachel. 1987 [1962]. Silertt Spring. 25th Anniversary Edition. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin. 
Cho ucr i, Nazli. 1 974. Population Dynamics and International Violence. Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 
Choucri, Nazli. 1986. Demographics and conflict. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42(4):24- 
25. 
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 44 B.C. De Re Publica. Harvard University Press. 
Clark, Colin. 1967. Population Growth and Land Use. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Clark, Colin. 1978. Population growth and productivity. Research in Population Economics. 
Clark, William C. 1989. The politics of planetary management. Environment 31. 
Coale, Ansley J. 1986. Population trends and economic development. In World Population 
and U.S. Policy: The Choices Ahead, edited by Jane Menkin. New York: W.W. 
Norton for the American Assembly. 
Coale, Ansley J. and Edgar M. Hoover. 1958. Population Growth and Economic 
Developt7tettt in Low-Income Countries. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Commoner, Barry H. 1971. The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 
Commoner, Barry, H. Boksenbaum, and M. Corr, Editors. 1975. Energy and Human 
Welfare: A Critical Analysis. 3 Volumes. New York: Macmillan. 
Daly, Herman E. 1977. Steady State Economics. San Francisco, California: W.H. Freeman. 
Daly, Herman E. 1986. Review of NAS report on population growth and economic 
development: Policy questions. Population and Development Review 12(3):582-585. 
Daly, Herman E, and John Cobb. 1989. For the Cotnmon Good: Redirecting the Economy 
Toward Comnzunity, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 
Demeny, Paul. 1985. Bucharest, Mexico City, and beyond. European Journal of Population 
1(2/3). 
Djerassi, Carl. 1986. Abortion in the United States: Politics or policy? Bulletin of the 
Atontic Scientists 42(4):38-4 1. 
Domar, Evsey D. 1957. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dore, Ronald P. 1976. The Diploma Disease: Education, Qualification and Development. 
London: Allen and Unwin. 
Dorfman, Robert. 1977. Econontics of the Environment: Selected Readings. New York: W.W. 
Norton. 
Durbin, P.T., Editor. 1980. A Guide to the Culture of Science, Technology, and Medicine. 
New York: Free Press. 
Durkheim, Emile. 1978 [1893]. De la Division du Travail Social. 10th Edition. Paris, France: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 
Ecology. 1986. Special Issue on Environment. 
Edington, John M., and M. Ann Edington. 1973. Ecology and Environmental Plantting. 
London: Chapman and Hall. 
Ehrlich, Paul R. 1968. The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1983. Extinction: The Causes and Consequences of 
the Disappearance of Species. New York: Ballantine. 
Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1986. World population crisis. Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 42(4): 13- 19. 
Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1990. The Population Explosion. New York: Simon 
and Schuster. 
Ehrlich, Paul R., and John P. Holdren. 1975. Human population and the global 
environment. In Population Debate (World Population Conference), pp. 92-104. New 
York: United Nations. 
Ehrlich, Paul R., Anne H. Ehrlich, and John P. Holdren. 1977. Ecoscience: Population, 
Resources, Environment. San Francisco, California: W.H. Freeman. 
Elliott, D.K., Editor. 1986. Dynamics of Extinction. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Enke, Stephen. 1959. The Worth of Population Control to India: Some Money Measures and 
Incentive Schemes. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corp. 
Enke, Stephen. 1969. Birth control for economic development. Science, May 16. 
Enke, Stephen. 1971. Economic consequences of rapid population growth. Economic 
Jounzal 80 (December). 
Forrester, Jay W. 1971. World Dynamics. Wright-Allen Press. 
Frank, Odile, and Geoffrey McNicoll. 1987. An interpretation of fertility and population 
policy in Kenya. PopuIation and Developnzent Review 13:209-243. 
Freedman, R., and J. Takeshita, et al. 1969. Family Planning in Taiwan: An Experiment in 
Social Chatzge. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Geertz, Clifford. 1963. Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change it1 
Indonesia. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 
George, Henry. 1902. Progress atzd Poverty. Fourth Edition. New York: Doubleday. 
Godwin, William. 1964 [1796]. Of Population: An Enquiry Concerning the Power of Increase. 
New York: A.M. Kelley. 
Hardin, Garett. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 1162:1243-1248. 
Hauser, Philip M., Editor. 1963. The Population Dilemma. New York: The American 
Assembly. 
Hermalin, Albert I. 1982. Issues in the comparative analysis of techniques for evaluating 
family planning programs. In Evaluation of the Impact of Family Planning 
Programmes on Fertility: Sources of Variance, pp. 29-40. New York: United Nations. 
Herman, Robert, Siamak A. Ardekani, and Jesse H. Ausubel. 1989. Dematerialization. In 
Technology and Environment, edited by Jesse H. Ausubel and Hedy E. Sladovich. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Hicks, J.R. 1971. The Social Franzework 4th Edition. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press. 
Higins,  Benjamin H., and Jean D. Higgins. 1979. Economic Development of a Small Planet. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
Higgins, G.M., et al. 1982. Potential Population Supporting Capacities of L a n d  in the 
Developing World Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
Hirschman, Albert 0. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Holling, C.S., Editor. 1978. Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. 
Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley. 
Howell, Nancy. 1979. Demography of the Dobe !Kung. New York: Academic Press. 
Johnson, D. Gale. 1974. World Food Problem and Prospects. Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute. 
Johnston, A., and A. Sasson. 1986. New Technologies and Development. Paris, France: 
UNESCO. 
Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. 1967. The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation 
on the Next Thirty-Tlzree Years. New York: Macmillan. 
Kelley, A.C., et al. 1982. Population and Development in Rural Egypt. Duke Press Policy 
Studies. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1960. Economic growth of small nations. In Econonzic Consequences of the 
Size of Nations, edited by E.A.G. Robinson. London: Macmillan. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1966. Modem Economic Growth, Rate, Structure and Spread New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1967. Population and economic growth. Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 1 1 l(3): 170- 193. 
Kuznets, Simon. 1975. Population trends and modern economic growth--notes towards a 
historical perspective. In The Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives, Papers 
of the World Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974,2 Volumes, pp. 425-433. New 
York: United Nations. 
Lee, Ronald. 1980. A historical perspective on economic aspects of the population 
explosion: The case of pre-industrial England. In Population and Economic Change 
in Developing Countries, edited by Richard E. Easterlin, pp. 517-556. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Leibenstein, Harvey. 1957. Econontic Backwardness and Economic Growth. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
Lestaeghe, Ron J., Editor. 1989. Reproduction and Social Organization in Sub-Salzaran 
Africa. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 
Lewis, W. Arthur. 1955. The Tlzeory of Economic Growth. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Maddox, John. 1990. Nature 346 (July 5) .  
Malthus, Thomas Robert. 1966 [1798]. First Essay on Population 1798 (A Reprint in 
Facsimile). London: Macmillan. 
Malthus, Thomas Robert. 1967. Population: The First Essay (Edited with an introduction 
by Kenneth E. Boulding). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Marshall, ALfred. 1961. Principles of Economics. 9th Edition. London: Macmillan. 
Mason, Andrew, and Daniel B. Suits. 1981. Computing the level and distribution of gains 
from fertility reduction. Research in Population Economics. 
Matthews, Jessica T., Editor. 1990. Preserving the Global Environment; The Challenge of 
Shared Leaderslzip. New York: W.W. Norton for the American Assembly. 
McNamara, Robert S. 1984. Time bomb or myth: The population problem. Foreign Affairs 
62(5):489-5 1 1. 
McNeil, William H. 1976. Plagues and Peoples. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press. 
McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1975. Economic-demographic models. In Populatiotz Growtlz and 
Economic Development in the Third World, edited by Leon Tabah, Volume 2. 
Dolhain: IUSSP, Ordina Editions. 
McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1981. Notes on population development modelling and policy 
formation. In Population and Development Modelling, Proceedings of the 
UN/UNFPA Expert Group Meeting, Geneva, 24-28 September 1979, pp. 93-96. New 
York: United Nations. 
McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1984. Consequences of rapid population growth: An overview and 
assessment. Population and Development Review lO(2): 177-240. 
Meadows, D.H, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W.W. Behrens 111. 1972. The Limits to 
Growth. New York: Universe Books. 
Meek, R.L. 1953. Mum and Engels on Malthus. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Menken, Jane, Editor. 1986. World Population and US. Policy: The Choices Ahead New 
York: W.W. Norton for the American Assembly. 
Mesavoric, M., and E. Pestel. 1974. Mankind at tlze Turning Point. New York: E.P. Dutton. 
Mill, John Stuart. 1848. Principles of Political Economy With Some of Their Applications to 
Social Philosophy. 
Mishan, E.J. 1969. Growth: The Price We Pay. Beekman Pubs. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Dranta: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. 1972. Against the Streanl. New York: Vintage Books. 
National Academy of Sciences. 1971. Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy 
Implications. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
National Academy of Sciences. 1986. Population and Development. Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press. 
Nordhaus, William D. 1990. Economist (July 7), p. 20. 
Notestein, Frank. 1945. Population: The long view. In Food for the World, edited by T.W. 
Schultz. Norman Wait Harris Memorial Fund Lectures. 
Notestein, Frank. 1975. Population policy and development: A summary view. In The 
Population Debate: Dit~zensiotu and Perspectives, Papers of the World Population 
Conference, Bucharest, 1974, 2 Volumes, pp. 538-542. New York: United Nations. 
Parikh, Jyoti K. 1988. Sustainable Developnlent of Agriculture. Boston, Massachusetts: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
Parikh, Kirit S. 1988. Towards Free Trade in Agriculture. Boston, Massachusetts: Martinus 
Nij hoff. 
Perlman, Mark. 1981. Population and economic change in developing countries: A review 
article. Jounlal of Economic Literature 19 (March):74-82. 
Perring, F.H., and K. Mellanby, Editors. 1978. Ecological Effects of Pesticides. London: 
Academic Press. 
Petersen, William. 1972. Readings in Population. New York: Macmillan. 
Prebish, Raul. 1971. Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task New York: 
Prager. 
Preston, Samuel H. 1984. Science (September 7), p. 1003. 
Preston, Samuel H. 1988. Are the economic consequences of population growth a sound 
basis for population policy? Population Bulletin of the United Nations. 
Repetto, Robert, Editor. 1985. The Global Possible. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press. 
Repetto, Robert. 1986. World Enough and Time: Successful Strategies for Resource 
Management. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Repetto, Robert. 1988. Forest for the Trees? Goventment Policies and the Misuse of Forest 
Resources. World Resources Institute. 
Revelle, Roger. 1971. Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications. 2 
Volumes. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press. 
Revelle, Roger. 1975. Will the earth's land and water resources be sufficient for future 
populations? Volume 2, pp. 3-14. Bucharest: United Nations. 
Revelle, Roger. 1976. The resources available for agriculture. Scientific American 
(September), pp. 165-178. 
Reynolds, Lloyd. 1969. Economics. 3rd Edition. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press. 
Ricardo, David. 1821. The principles of political economy and taxation. Contained in The 
Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, 1951-73, edited by Piero Sraffa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ridker, Ronald. 1976. Population and Development: The Search for Selective Interventions. 
Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press. 
Riley, James C. 1985. Population Thought in the Age of the Demographic Revolution. 
Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. 
Roberts, R.D., and T.M. Roberts, Editors. 1986. Planning and Ecology. London: Chapman 
and Hall. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P.N. 1964. Capital Fonnation and Economic Development. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Ross, John A., and W. Parker Mauldin. 1988. Berelson on Population. New York: Springer 
Verlag. 
Sadik, Nafis. 1990. Population: Time to invest in people. People 17(1). 
Sanderson, Warren. 1980. Economic-Demographic Simulation Models: A Review of Their 
Usefulness for Policy Analysis. RR-80-14. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis. 
Sauvy, Alfred. 1963. Thtorie gtntrale de la population. 2 Volumes. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
Sauvy, Alfred. 1969. General Theory of Population (tr. by C. Campos). New York: Basic 
Books. 
Sauvy, Alfred. 1981. Population changes: Contemporary models and theories. In Research 
in Population Economics, edited by Julian L. Simon and Peter H. Lindert, Volume 
3, pp. 225-238. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press. 
Schneider, S.H. 1989. Global Warnting: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? San 
Francisco, California: Sierra Club Books. 
Schultz, Henry. 1958. The Theory and Measurement of Der7zand. Chicago, Illinois: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Schultz, Theodore. 1961. Education and economic growth. In Social Forces Influencing 
American Education, edited by N.B. Henry. Chicago, Illinois: National Society for the 
Study of Education. 
Scott, Randall W., Editor. 1975. Management and Control of Growth. 2 Volumes. 
Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute. 
Sen, Amartya K. 1981. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivatiorz. 
Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press. 
Shaw, R. Paul. 1983. Mobilizirtg Hurnan Resources in the Arab World. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Shaw, R. Paul. 1989. Rapid population growth and environmental degradation: Ultimate 
versus proximate factors. E~lvironmental Conservation 16(3): 199-208. 
Siew-Ean-Khoo. 1 978. Effects of Progranl Contraception on Fertility: A Comparison of Three 
Asian Courttries. Paper 54. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Population Institute. 
Simon, Julian L. 1977. The Economics of Population Growth. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Simon, Julian L. 1981. The Ultirttate Resource. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Simon, Julian L. 1982. A scheme to promote world economic development with migration. 
In Researclz in Population Economics, edited by J.L. Simon and P.H. Lindert, Volume 
4. Greenwich. Connecticut: JAI Press. 
Simon, Julian L., and Roy Gobin. 1981. The relationship between population and economic 
growth in LDCs. Research in Population Economics 2:215-234. 
Simon, Julian L., and Herman Kahn. 1984. The Resourceful Earth. A Response to Global 
2000. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell. 
Solow, A.R. 1988. Pseudo-scientific hot air. The data on climate are inconclusive. New York 
Times 138:A15(N), A27(1). 
Spengler, Joseph J. 1942. French Predecessors of Malthus. Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press. 
Stangeland, Charles Emil. 1967 [1904]. Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population. New York: 
AMS Press. 
Tinbergen, J. 1962. Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic 
Policy. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 
United Nations. 1972. Environment Stockholm. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations. 
United Nations. 1973. Determinants and Consequences of Population Trendci. Especially 
Chapter 3, Population Theory, pp. 33-63. 
Wilber, Charles K., Editor. 1988. The Political Economy of Development and 
Underdevelopment. New York: Random House. 
World Bank. 1984. World Development Report 1984. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. 1988. World Development Report 1988. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Resources Institute. 1990 and annually. World Resources 1990-91. New York: Basic 
Books. 
